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“GENOCIDE”—THE POWER OF A LABEL
Michael J. Kelly*
I know that I shall meet my fate 
Somewhere among the clouds above; 
Those that I fight I do not hate, 
Those that I guard I do not love; 
My country is Kiltartan Cross, 
My countrymen Kiltartan's poor, 
No likely end could bring them loss 
Or leave them happier than before. 
Nor law, nor duty bade me fight, 
Nor public men, nor cheering crowds, 
A lonely impulse of delight 
Drove to this tumult in the clouds; 
I balanced all, brought all to mind, 
The years to come seemed waste of breath, 
A waste of breath the years behind 
In balance with this life, this death. 
—W.B. Yeats,  
An Irish Airman Foresees His Death 
The irony and ethical quandary of those who fight on behalf of oth-
ers is an age-old riddle not likely to be solved anytime soon. Military inter-
vention to stop genocide, which is unauthorized by the United Nations, is a 
voluntary, and perhaps illegal, action on the part of states seeking to protect 
a people not their own. The duty to intervene with genocide, if it exists at 
all, is murky. The atrocity to be prevented is defined, although that defini-
tion is being pulled in multiple directions. Like the airman in Yeats’ poem, 
neither law nor duty may compel action, yet how can the world countenance 
genocide while it retains the ability to act? 
Any state may be faced with the following situation: an unspeaka-
ble series of atrocities unfolds in the arid, rocky lands of a far off nation 
 *  Professor of Law, Creighton University School of Law. J.D., Indiana University; 
LL.M. Georgetown University. Professor Kelly is author of the book NOWHERE TO HIDE:
DEFEAT OF THE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY DEFENSE FOR CRIMES OF GENOCIDE & THE TRIALS OF 
SLOBODAN MILOSEVIC AND SADDAM HUSSEIN (Peter Lang ed., 2005), with a foreword by 
Desmond Tutu, which received the 2006 Book of the Year Award from the U.S. National 
Section of L’Association Internationale de Droit Pénal. 
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located on an exotic-sounding continent. Mass rapes, deportations, starva-
tions, and ultimately death ensue. The events are terrible beyond descrip-
tion. The international community has not acted. The United Nations is in 
stasis under the threat of a veto from a permanent Security Council member. 
Civil war hangs in the air, ready to erupt. Is this genocide? Does it matter? 
Why? 
Those three questions are the subject of this essay. They all derive 
from exploring the power of labeling a given or unfolding atrocity as “ge-
nocide.” Politicians, scholars, relief agencies, and distinguished judges at 
international tribunals regularly agonize over whether to apply the label. 
Most recently, collective hand-wringing focused on the crisis in Darfur, 
Sudan. The moral, political, and legal consequences that follow from with-
holding or applying the genocide label vary with the circumstance, and the 
effects of applying the label can truncate options for dealing with the situa-
tion. One commentator has noted,  
The danger of the word ‘genocide’ is that it can slide from its wider, legal-
ly specific meaning, to a branding of the perpetrators’ group as collective-
ly evil. Having labeled a group or a government as ‘genocidal,’ it is diffi-
cult to make the case that a political compromise needs to be found with 
them. This leaves only various forms of pressure, such as sanctions, prose-
cution in a court of law, and, of course, military intervention. Sanctions 
rarely work. Prosecution is by definition too late for the specific crime in 
question. Military intervention is a clumsy tool that runs serious risks of 
failure and of inflammatory side effects.1
Parties to the Genocide Convention undertake dual obligations—to 
punish and to prevent genocide. These obligations, however, are couched in 
language that significantly qualifies their successful undertaking. The two 
main tracks of debate today concern, first, the content of the definition and, 
second, whether a legal duty of intervention arises if the definition is trig-
gered. Academics are more concerned with the former, while politicians are 
more concerned with the latter. 
The definition from the 1948 convention is straightforward. Geno-
cide is: 
Any of the following acts committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in 
part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such:  
(a) Killing members of the group;  
(b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group;  
(c) Deliberately inflicting on the group conditions of life calculated to 
bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part;  
1 Alex de Waal, Reflections on the Difficulties of Defining Darfur's Crisis as Genocide,
20 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 25, 31 (2007). 
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(d) Imposing measures intended to prevent births within the group;  
(e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to another group.2
States are obligated to prevent and punish genocide.3 As for pu-
nishment, the treaty restricts states to self-policing, trying suspects “in the 
territory of which the act was committed,” or turning to the international 
community.4 As for prevention, intervention rests in collective action via 
either the United Nations or the state where the atrocities are occurring, not 
individual foreign states.5 It has been noted that “[t]he 1948 Genocide Con-
vention is silent about the means required to ‘prevent and punish’ the crime 
of genocide, and it would have been an anomalous anachronism for the 
member states of the UN to have made an exception to its rule of outlawing 
aggressive war by specifying that genocide created a duty of intervention.”6
Nevertheless, if a new norm of humanitarian intervention has crys-
tallized in customary international law, then the Genocide Convention may 
have been altered to allow for this possibility, especially if genocide is con-
sidered to have passed into the jus cogens canon.7 But even if intervention is 
possible, the question of whether there is a legal duty or right to intervene 
remains open. Moreover, this question exists uncomfortably, but necessari-
ly, alongside the reality that demonstrated inadequacies of the international 
system to respond to genocide create a vacuum for non-U.N. sanctioned 
humanitarian intervention to fill.8
On the question of definitional content, concerns coalesce around 
expanding or contracting the definition of genocide. If it is expanded to in-
clude cultural annihilation or political repression, then the crime becomes 
more akin to a crime against humanity—the category of internationally cri-
minalized conduct from which it originally sprang.9 Purists want to keep 
genocide limited to the most extreme atrocities and retain it as a distinct 
crime. 
2 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948, T.I.A.S. 
No. 1021, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
3 Id. at art. 1. 
4 See id. at art. 6. 
5 Id. at art. 8; see also, William A. Schabas, Genocide, Crimes Against Humanity, and 
Darfur: The Commission of Inquiry's Findings on Genocide, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1703, 
1718 (2006) (“[A]ny duty to prevent genocide that may involve the use of force must receive 
the imprimatur of the Security Council.”). 
6 Alex de Waal, No Such Thing as Humanitarian Intervention, HARVARD INT’L REV.,
March 21, 2007, http://hir.harvard.edu/articles/1482/ (emphasis added). 
7 David B. Kopel, Paul Gallant, & Joanne D. Eisen, Is Resisting Genocide a Human 
Right?, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1275, 1327 (2006). 
8 See generally id. (discussing international anti-genocide programs, the Genocide Con-
vention, and other sources of international human rights law). 
9 Schabas, supra note 5, at 1719–20. 
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These issues are not restricted to current events. Turkey and the 
United States recently experienced a severe diplomatic breach over applying 
the label “genocide” to the 1915 mass deaths of Turkish Armenians at the 
hands of the Ottomans. On October 10, 2007, the U.S. House of Representa-
tives Foreign Affairs Committee passed a resolution labeling the atrocity 
genocide, despite heavy lobbying from the president not to do so for strateg-
ic diplomatic reasons.10 Before being immediately recalled to Ankara, Tur-
key’s ambassador said that being labeled as precursors to Hitler “is a very 
injurious move to the psyche of the Turkish people.”11
It was in the context of the First World War that the tragedy des-
tined to befall the Turkish Armenian population began to unfold. The Otto-
man Empire’s response to participation by a Christian Armenian division in 
a Russian-sponsored action against Turkey, as well as the declaration of a 
provisional Armenian government, was swift and brutal.12 The Turkish gov-
ernment undertook an “undeclared campaign of genocide against [its] Ar-
menian subjects . . . .”13 The resulting genocide of the Armenians was orga-
nized as a march “into the desert to die of starvation and thirst.”14 This brut-
al action led to the deaths of approximately 700,000 men, women, and 
children.15
10 A Resolution Too Far, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, at 16. 
11 Unearthing the Past, Endangering the Future, ECONOMIST, Oct. 20, 2007, at 34 [herei-
nafter Unearthing the Past].
12 See JOHN KEEGAN, THE FIRST WORLD WAR 223 (1999). 
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.; see also PETER DU PREEZ, GENOCIDE: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF MASS MURDER 5 (Peter 
Collins ed., 1994). Some, however, put the death toll as high as 1.5 million. See H.R. REP.
NO. 106-933, sec. 2, at 1 (2000) (noting the Armenian genocide killed 1.5 million men, 
women and children); Robert F. Melson, The Armenian Genocide as Precursor and Proto-
type of Twentieth-Century Genocide, in IS THE HOLOCAUST UNIQUE?: PERSPECTIVES ON 
COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 119, 121 (Alan S. Rosenbaum ed., 2nd ed. 2001) (stating that ap-
proximately one million Armenians, out of a total population of two million, were killed 
between 1915 and 1918); SHAVARSH TORIGUIAN, THE ARMENIAN QUESTION AND 
INTERNATIONAL LAW 9 (2nd ed. 1988) (1973). 
  The Turkish government still denies that the Armenian Genocide ever took place de-
spite its recognition by countless historians and governments. See Henry R. Huttenbach, The 
Psychology and Politics of Genocide Denial: A Comparison of Four Case Studies, in
STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE GENOCIDE 217–19 (Levon Chorbajian & George Shirinian eds., 
1999); William H. Honan, Princeton is Accused of Fronting for the Turkish Government,
N.Y. TIMES, May 22, 1996, at B1 (calling Armenian deaths “the unintended result of wartime 
deprivation”); Stephen Kinzer, Turks Fume Over Stance by French on Armenia, N.Y. TIMES,
June 21, 1998, at A4 (explaining Turkey’s denial of France’s public recognition of the Ar-
menian genocide); International Affirmation of the Armenian Genocide, Armenian National 
Institute, available at http://www.armenian-genocide.org/affirmation /resolutions/index.php 
(listing nations which have publicly recognized the Armenian genocide). 
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In fact, the Young Turks regime, which had replaced the old Sulta-
nate, used the outbreak of war in 1914 to effect this atrocity as an ultimate 
solution to the “Armenian question,” which had long nagged the Turkish 
government.16 Although the process was to be carried out in secret,17 dis-
patches from foreign officials clearly reflected the magnitude of what was 
happening.18 After the war, Henry Morgenthau, America’s Ambassador to 
Constantinople, recounted: 
The final and worst measure used against the Armenians was the whole-
sale deportation of the entire population from their homes and their exile 
to the desert, with all the accompanying horrors on the way. No means 
were provided for their transportation or nourishment. The victims . . . had 
to walk on foot, exposed to attacks of bands of criminals especially orga-
nized for that purpose. Homes were literally uprooted; families were sepa-
rated; men killed, women and girls violated daily on the way or taken to 
harems. Children were thrown into rivers or sold to strangers by their 
mothers to save them from starvation. The facts contained in the reports 
received at the Embassy from absolutely trustworthy eye-witnesses surpass 
the most beastly and diabolical cruelties ever before perpetrated or im-
agined in the history of the world.19
Telegrams from the Interior Ministry collected after the capitulation 
of Turkey confirmed the government’s intention to destroy the Armenian 
population. Two communications from Interior Minister Talaat Pasha fo-
cused monstrously on the destruction of Armenian children: 
To the Government of Aleppo, 
January 15, 1916—We hear that certain orphanages which have been 
opened receive also the children of the Armenians. Whether this is done 
  Moreover, Turkey, currently a candidate for membership in the European Union, con-
tinues to strenuously lobby against recognition of the Armenian massacre as “genocide” by 
the United States. See Douglas Frantz, Some in Turkey See Minefield Along Road to Euro-
pean Union, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 1, 2000, at A13 (discussing Turkey’s progress with European 
Union admission); Eric Schmitt, The House Races; Republican’s Unusual Gift: A Vote on the 
House Floor, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 2000, at A11 (describing Turkey’s acknowledgment of 
Armenian deaths as the result of “civil unrest”); Eric Schmitt, House Backs Off on Condemn-
ing Turks’ Killing of Armenians, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 20, 2000, at A11 (explaining how Turkey 
will take political action to prevent United States recognition of Armenian genocide). 
16 See TORIGUIAN, supra note 15. 
17 Id.
18 Id. at 18–22 (excerpting correspondence of the German Foreign Ministry between 1914 
and 1918 on the Armenian question); see also Vahakn N. Dadrian, Documentation of the 
Armenian Genocide in German and Austrian Sources, in 3 THE WIDENING CIRCLE OF 
GENOCIDE: A CRITICAL BIBLIOGRAPHIC REVIEW 77–125 (Israel W. Charny ed., 1994). 
19 TORIGUIAN, supra note 15, at 13 (quoting HENRY MORGENTHAU, THE TRAGEDY OF 
ARMENIA 7 (1918), available at http://digital .library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/History. 
Morgenthau02) (emphasis in original).  
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through some ignorance of our real purpose, or through contempt of it, the 
Government will regard the feeding of such children or any attempt to pro-
long their lives as an act entirely opposed to its purpose, since it considers 
the survival of these children as detrimental. I recommend that such child-
ren shall not be received into the orphanages, and no attempts are to be 
made to establish special orphanages for them. 
March 7, 1916—Collect the children of the indicated persons who, by or-
der of the War Office, have been gathered together and cared for by the 
military authorities. Take them away on the pretext that they are to be 
looked after by the Deportations Committee, so as not to arouse suspicion. 
Destroy them and report.20
The United States subsequently dispatched Major General James G. 
Harbord to Anatolia and the Caucasus on a fact-finding mission in the 
summer of 1919. His report to the Senate the following year confirmed the 
extent of the massacres: 
Massacres and deportations were organized in the spring of 1915 under de-
finite system, the soldiers going from town to town. The official reports of 
the Turkish government show 1,100,000 as having been deported. The 
young men were first summoned to the government building in each vil-
lage and then marched out and killed. The women, the old men, and child-
ren were, after a few days, deported to what Talaat Pasha called “agricul-
tural colonies,” from the high, cool, breeze-swept plateau of Armenia to 
the malarial flats of the Euphrates and the burning sands of Syria and Ara-
bia . . . Mutilation, violation, torture and death have left their haunting 
memories in a hundred beautiful Armenian valleys, and the traveler in that 
region is seldom free from the evidence of this most colossal crime of all 
the ages.21
Thanks to the lobbying efforts of a wealthy Armenian diaspora, 
several states (or legislatures therein), including Greece, Italy, Russia, Swit-
zerland, Argentina, Australia, Canada, France, the Vatican and the Euro-
pean Parliament, have taken political stands to recognize the atrocities 
committed against Armenians as genocide, even though neither the term nor 
the crime existed when the atrocities occurred.22
20 Id. at 16–18.  
21 Id. at 22–23 (quoting MAJOR GENERAL JAMES G. HARBORD, CONDITIONS IN THE NEAR
EAST: REPORT OF THE AMERICAN MILITARY MISSION TO ARMENIA, S. DOC. NO. 266 at 7 
(1920)).
22 See Armenian Nat’l Comm. of Am., Genocide Recognition (2006), available at
http://www.anca.org/genocide/recognition.php. In the United States, forty of the fifty United 
States have also recognized the Armenian Genocide. See Armenian Nat’l Comm. Of Am., 
Genocide Recognition by U.S. States (2006), available at http://www.anca.org/genocide/ 
states_map.php. 
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House Resolution 106, which passed the Foreign Affairs committee 
on a vote of twenty-seven to twenty-one and which has 226 co-sponsors, 
states that “[t]he Armenian Genocide was conceived and carried out by the 
Ottoman Empire. . . .” and “calls upon the President in the President's an-
nual message commemorating the Armenian Genocide issued on or about 
April 24, to accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihila-
tion of 1,500,000 Armenians as genocide. . . .”23
Seeking to mitigate the damage to U.S.-Turkish relations, Secretary 
of State Condoleezza Rice noted that “the American people don’t feel that 
the current Turkish government is the Ottoman Empire.”24 That, however, is 
cold comfort to the Turks, who still deny that the atrocity was genocide, and 
who are still strenuously seeking to derail the measure before a vote by the 
full House of Representatives.  
Turkey has succeeded in gaining renewed support from the White 
House. President Bush argued that “one thing Congress should not be doing 
is sorting out the historical record of the Ottoman Empire . . . Congress has 
more important work to do than antagonizing a democratic ally in the Mus-
lim world, especially one that is providing vital support for our military 
everyday.”25 This has stalled, but not killed, the resolution. The Speaker’s 
support has waned, as Turkey holds its strategic military alliance with Israel 
hostage in exchange—causing support for the Armenian resolution to col-
lapse among key Jewish members of the House.26
The issue of genocide labeling is also occurring in the twenty-first 
century, as it has most recently erupted in the Darfur region of Western Su-
dan. The origins of this crisis are not unique in Africa, which has suffered 
numerous struggles over land and resources, with power often divided along 
ethno-religious lines. The Arab-dominated government in Khartoum has 
long been fighting an insurgency against its regime. In the 1980s the deci-
sion was taken to employ local militias to fight on behalf of the government 
as a proxy.  
These Arab militias targeted black settlements in the South; “[t]hey 
were not paid but were allowed to keep what they looted, including cattle, 
household possessions, and even women and children. Only vague orders 
were given, and the insurgent areas were instead declared an ethics-free 
zone, in which no reporting back was required, and no questions were 
23 Affirmation of the United States Record on the Armenian Genocide Resolution, H.R. 
Res 106, 110th Cong. §§2–3 (2007) (as passed by the Foreign Affairs Committee to the Full 
House on Oct. 10, 2007). See House Comm. Approves Armenian Genocide Resol., CNN, 
Oct. 10, 2007, http://www.cnn.comm/2007/POLITICS/10/10/us.turkey.armenians/.  
24 Unearthing the Past, supra note 11, at 34. 
25 Carl Hulse, House Speaker Now Unsure if Armenian Genocide Motion Will Reach a 
Vote, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2007, at A16. 
26 Id.
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asked.”27 The relationship of the militias to the Sudanese government under 
President al Bashir is not unlike that between the Bosnian-Serb militias and 
the Yugoslav government under Slobodan Milosevic during the Bosnian 
civil war. 
This conflict spread to Western Sudan, specifically the Darfur re-
gion, in 2003, as rebels began arming themselves and attacking government 
troops. Again, using armed militias as proxy fighters, the government 
sought to eradicate resistance along ethnic lines. The ultimate aim of the 
Arab-dominated Islamic government in Khartoum is to eliminate the black 
African population from Darfur and “Arabize” the region,28 similar to Sad-
dam Hussein’s Arabization efforts of the Kurdish areas in northern Iraq 
during the 1980’s. Suliman Giddo, a native of Darfur and founder of the 
Darfur Peace and Development Group said, “[i]t’s not like regular war. The 
government, with the Janjaweed, are killing people and replacing them.”29
Only a year and a half into the Darfur conflict, the State Department 
reported that the humanitarian crisis had reached disastrous levels: 
As of August 2004, based on available information, more than 405 villages 
in Darfur had been completely destroyed, with an additional 123 substan-
tially damaged, since February 2003. Approximately 200,000 persons had 
sought refuge in eastern Chad as of August, according to the UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR); the UN Office for the Coordina-
tion of Humanitarian Affairs reports another 1.2 million internally dis-
placed persons (IDPs) remain in western Sudan. The total population of 
Darfur is 6 million. The lack of security in the region continues to threaten 
displaced persons. Insecurity and heavy rains continue to disrupt humani-
tarian assistance. The UN World Food Program provided food to nearly 
940,000 people in Darfur in July. Nonetheless, since the beginning of the 
Darfur food program, a total of 82 out of 154 concentrations of IDPs have 
received food, leaving 72 locations unassisted. Relief and health experts 
warn that malnutrition and mortality are likely to increase as forcibly dis-
placed and isolated villagers suffer from hunger and infectious diseases 
that will spread quickly among densely populated and malnourished popu-
lations. The health situation for the 200,000 refugees in Chad is ominous.30
27 de Waal, supra note 1, at 28.  
28 See G. Jeffrey McDonald, In Sudan Crisis, A Duty to Intervene?, CHRIST. SCI.
MONITOR, July 21, 2004, at 16. 
29 Id.
30 U.S. Dep’t of State Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and The Bureau of 
Intelligence Research, Documenting Atrocities in Darfur, Sept. 2004, http://www.state.gov/g/ 
drl/rls/36028.htm. 
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The State Department conducted interviews of those who had relo-
cated to refugee camps in neighboring Chad. These interviews revealed the 
degree of horror witnessed by the surviving members of the local population 
at the hands of the government-sponsored militias: 
31
The United States recognized the atrocities carried out in Darfur as 
genocide by the government of Sudan.32 Meanwhile, a high-level panel of 
the United Nations, led by Antonio Cassese, found that Sudanese govern-
ment forces and militias were responsible for mass killings, torture, rapes, 
and forced displacement of civilians, but not genocide due to a lack of intent 
“to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious 
31 SOAT Receives Prestigious Prize as Torture and Killing Escalates in Darfur, Aug. 31, 
2006, http://www.irct.org/Default.aspx?ID=159&M=News&PID=577&NewsID=448.
32 The Current Situation in Sudan and the Prospects for Peace: Hearing Before the 
Comm. on Foreign Rel., 108th Cong. 8 (2004) (statement of Colin Powell, Sec’y of State of 
the United States). 
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group, as such.”33 That finding—withholding the label “genocide”—
seriously undermined efforts to marshal international action to stop the 
atrocities in Darfur. 
[T]he Report, together with the resulting news reports, made the struggle 
for Darfur intervention more difficult by undercutting efforts by Darfur ac-
tion groups to mobilize public support. With headlines such as Murder—
But No Genocide, the motivation to intervene was gone. Murder is bad, to 
be sure—but murder is ordinary. One might lobby Congress to do some-
thing about genocide, but who ever heard of lobbying Congress to stop fo-
reigners from murdering each other? Foreigners murder each other all the 
time. Genocide sounds like it might be our business, but ‘mere’ murder is 
theirs.34
The Security Council referred the disagreement between the United 
States and the United Nations to the new International Criminal Court (ICC) 
for investigation.35 Although the prosecutor for the ICC has undertaken an 
investigation of criminal activity in Darfur, he has only brought war crimes 
and crimes against humanity charges against two individuals,36 and has 
stated, “allegations have been made that . . . groups involved in the commis-
sion of crimes in Darfur did so with specific genocidal intent. This issue 
remains the subject of investigation and the Prosecutor has not, and will not, 
draw any conclusions as to the character of the crimes pending the comple-
tion of a full and impartial investigation.”37
Meanwhile, the atrocities in Darfur continue. In his latest report to 
the Security Council, the ICC’s prosecutor, Luis Moreno-Ocampo, noted 
The ongoing situation remains alarming. There are 4 million people in 
need of humanitarian assistance in the region, two thirds of the population 
of Darfur; there are two million internally displaced people, who continue 
to be immensely vulnerable; there are continuing attacks against them and 
33 John R. Cook, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating to International 
Law, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 479, 501 (2005); see International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur, 
Report of the International Commission of Inquiry on Darfur to the United Nations Secre-
tary-General, para. 459, U.N. Doc. S/2005/60 (Jan. 25, 2005). 
34 David Luban, Calling Genocide by Its Rightful Name: Lemkin's Word, Darfur, and the 
UN Report, 7 CHI. J. INT’L L. 303, 306 (2006). 
35 See generally S.C. Res. 1593, U.N. Doc. S/Res/508 (March 31, 2005) (referring the 
situation in Darfur to the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court). 
36 Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Fifth Report of the Prosecutor of the Int’l Crimi-
nal Court to the UN Sec. Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 1 (June 7, 2007), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_ReportUNSC5-Darfur_ 
English.pdf [hereinafter Fifth Report of the ICC Prosecutor]. 
37 Prosecutor of the Int’l Criminal Court, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the Int’l Crim-
inal Court to the UN Sec. Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005), at 3 (June 14, 2006), 
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/OTP_ReportUNSC_3-Darfur_English.pdf.
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against international workers, as well as frequent impediments by the au-
thorities to the delivery of assistance. . . .  
Attacks against UN, AU and humanitarian personnel are well docu-
mented. Reports allege indiscriminate and disproportionate air strikes by 
the Government of the Sudan that have caused destruction, loss of life and 
new displacement of civilians. Similarly, there are allegations of crimes 
committed by rebel forces.38
With respect to the definition of genocide itself, the debate within 
academic circles is a teleological one—concentrating on the content of what 
can be considered genocide. Restrictivists seek to restrain the label’s usage 
to atrocities more akin to the Holocaust, while expansionists seek to broa-
den the label’s usage to include tangential atrocities. 
The oldest element of the restrictivist school is Jewish ownership of 
the term “Holocaust,” and, by extension, of the ultimate model of geno-
cide.39 Although that position is still defended today by Israel and the Anti-
Defamation League in the United States, the terms have found purchase as 
descriptors in other situations. What scholars now argue strenuously about 
is whether the definition of genocide covers (with or without specific intent) 
atrocities, such as extermination and ethnic cleansing, and whether political 
groups should be included as protected groups. 
Prof. David Luban, of Georgetown University, believes “extermina-
tion” should be included in the definition to elevate that crime into genocid-
al conduct and avoid Darfur-like confusions.40 Meanwhile, Prof. William 
Schabas of the National University of Ireland believes that ethnic cleansing, 
the practice of forcibly removing large populations from a territory, should 
not be included in the definition.41 Yet, the court in Akayesu interpreted 
non-lethal acts, such as restriction to subsistence diet, expulsion from 
homes, and reduction in essential medical services, as genocidal acts within 
the meaning of the “inflicting conditions of life” prong of the definition.42
Debates about whether ethnic cleansing constitutes genocide have raged 
since the Kosovo campaign, and have yet to be resolved.43 Prof. Schabas’ 
38 Fifth Report of the ICC Prosecutor, supra note 34, at 2. 
39 See Jewish Virtual Library, Holocaust Glossary: Terms, Places, and Personalities, 
http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/Holocaust/wiesenthal_glossary.html. 
40 Luban, supra note 36, at 320. 
41 “In Professor William Schabas’ words, ‘Ethnic cleansing is . . . a warning sign of geno-
cide to come. Genocide is the last resort of the frustrated ethnic cleanser.’” Patricia Wald, 
General Radislav Krstic: A War Crimes Case Study, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 445, 462–63 
n. 49 (2003) (quoting WILLIAM A. SCHABAS, GENOCIDE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (2000)). 
42 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. I.C.T.R. 96-4-T, Judgment, para. 506 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
43 Schabas, supra note 5, at 1708. 
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position, however, was recently buttressed by an opinion of the Internation-
al Court of Justice in the case of Bosnia v. Serbia.44
Although others have tried to reinsert protection for political groups 
since the adoption of the genocide definition in the 1948 Convention, U.S. 
Naval Academy scholar Barbara Harff is the most recent academic to con-
flate the term politicide, or political mass murder, with genocide.  The So-
viet Union insisted as a precondition to joining the treaty that political 
groups be excluded as protected groups.45 The ICTR noted, however, that 
the character of the four protected groups in the treaty definition is disposi-
tive of why they are protected:  
On reading through the travaux preparatoires of the Genocide Conven-
tion, it appears that the crime of genocide was allegedly perceived as tar-
geting only ‘stable’ groups, constituted in a permanent fashion and mem-
bership of which is determined by birth, with the exclusion of the more 
‘mobile’ groups which one joins through individual voluntary commit-
ment, such as political and economic groups.46
Therefore, political groups cannot be included. 
Why is such political and academic vitriol being spilled on the 
question of labeling atrocities “genocide?” The intensity of the argument 
with respect to past atrocities reflects the desire of modern states not to be 
pasted with the stigma of having committed genocide. Modern Turks, for 
instance, are concerned with being compared to Hitler’s Nazis, despite the 
fact that the genocide of Turkey’s Armenians was carried out by the Otto-
mans.
With respect to unfolding atrocities, the intensity of the argument 
over applying the genocide label reflects the potentially high stakes of ac-
tually having to do something to stop it. Once genocide is found to be oc-
curring, a moral and political duty arises in favor of action. The post-
Holocaust mantra “never again” is chanted by pressure groups and nongo-
vernmental organizations, pleading with states to deploy troops. But beyond 
the moral and political responsibility, is there a legal obligation to inter-
vene?
44 See Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
(Bosn. v. Serb.), 2007 I.C.J. 71 (Feb. 26) [hereinafter Judgment (Bosn. v. Serb.)]. “Neither 
the intent . . . to render an area ‘ethnically homogenous,’ nor the operations that may be 
carried out to implement such policy, can as such be designated as genocide: the intent that 
characterizes genocide is ‘to destroy’ . . . and deportation or displacement . . . is not necessar-
ily equivalent to destruction . . . .” Id. (emphasis in original). 
45 See Barbara Harff, No Lessons Learned from the Holocaust? Assessing Risks of Geno-
cide and Political Mass Murder Since 1955, 97 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 57, 58 (2003). 
46 Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. I.C.T.R. 96-4-T, Judgment, para. 511 (Sept. 2, 1998). 
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Two schools of thought are forming that arrive at divergent answers 
to this question. The non-interventionist school denies a legal duty based on 
a plain reading of the Genocide Convention. This school admits, however, 
the moral and political responsibility, and even advocates undertaking all 
other actions short of military intervention (economic sanctions, embargoes, 
etc.). The option of intervention is also on the table, under a newly devel-
oped theory of a sovereignty waiver if states commit genocide against their 
own people. Whether or not to exercise that option is in the discretion of 
each state. 
Meanwhile, the interventionist school is a natural outgrowth of the 
post-war human rights movement. This school holds that a duty to intervene 
arises once genocide has been determined, and states with the capacity to 
act that do not do so are in breach of an international legal obligation. Wide-
spread acceptance of humanitarian intervention by states, as well as the 
U.N. leadership in the 1990’s, forms the basis for this school’s underlying 
theory. Coupled with widespread acknowledgement that Rwanda’s geno-
cide was preventable (followed by the public contrition by states, including 
the United States), this school relies heavily on the moral and political 
weight of 800,000 dead Rwandans to buttress its legal argument.47
Both schools have influential supporters. President Bush, although a 
robust interventionist when it comes to defending American interests, does 
not, in fact, recognize a duty to intervene to stop genocide—especially in 
Africa.48 Richard Haass, president of the Council on Foreign Relations, also 
a robust interventionist against states that pursue weapons of mass destruc-
tion, harbor terrorists, or commit genocide on the theory that they have 
waived their sovereign right against intervention, recognizes no state-
centered duty to intervene—only an option. The existence of a duty incum-
bent upon the international community collectively is possible.49
Yet some commentators have noted that the threshold for interven-
tion is such that even non-interventionists should take comfort that interven-
tion would not be required very often. “[S]topping genocide doesn’t commit 
America to intervene everywhere. It actually sets the bar to intervention 
very high and justifies the use of force only when large numbers of civilians 
47 See Gregory H. Stanton, Could the Rwandan Genocide Have Been Prevented?,
GENOCIDE WATCH, Jan. 27, 2002, available at http://www.genocidewatch.org/aboutus/ 
stantonrwandapreventionarticle.htm. 
48 See Michael Ignatieff, The Next President’s Duty to Intervene, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13, 
2000, at WK17. 
49 Michael J. Kelly, Pulling at the Threads of Westphalia: “Involuntary Sovereignty Waiv-
er”—Revolutionary International Legal Theory or Return to Rule by the Great Powers?, 10 
UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 361, 414–15 (2005). 
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are facing extermination, mass deportation or massacre and where force can 
actually turn the situation around.”50
Unsurprisingly, many interventionists go beyond using genocide as 
a trigger, arguing that any type of mass atrocity should provoke an interven-
tion; a technical finding, or lack thereof, of genocide should not be the oper-
ative barrier. In the context of Darfur, the wrangling over whether genocide 
has occurred, they argue, is especially inappropriate: 
Focusing the international assessment of this conflict on the genocide 
question has obscured and distorted the issues of real importance and pro-
vided a delay tactic for states reluctant to intervene to protect civilian pop-
ulations from mass state-sponsored violence. . . . When civilians are the 
deliberate objects of attack, when entire villages and livelihoods are de-
stroyed, when women and girls are mass raped, the possibility of humani-
tarian intervention is implicated, regardless of the identity of the victims or 
the specific intent of the perpetrators to destroy the victim group.51
As for the end to this duty, interventionists do not consider falling 
death rates to mitigate the duty to act. Declining deaths in Darfur in late 
2007 prompted prominent academics to write: 
As if Darfur hasn’t suffered enough, some Western diplomats want to pu-
nish victims of the genocide for dying in smaller numbers. The United Na-
tions recently confirmed a decline in the death rate, which a diplomatic 
official, quoted anonymously in the Los Angeles Times, and echoing the 
sentiments of others, argues is evidence that the genocide is over. But ac-
cording to international law, genocide ends only when murders, torture 
and destruction of food, water and shelter ends. . . . Genocide is not a 
crime of severity; it is a crime of intent. As long as Sudan and its agents 
act with the intention to eliminate civilians in Darfur, every weapon in the 
arsenal of the international community should be used to stop them. That 
means admitting that trying to wipe a group of people off the face of the 
earth still shocks our basic concept of humanity, whatever the latest death 
statistics report.52
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has come down on the side 
of the interventionist school. In a qualified opinion, the ICJ recently held 
Serbia accountable for a breach of its international legal obligation to pre-
vent genocide.53 The genocide in question was the July 1995 massacre of 
Bosnian Muslim men by the Bosnian Serb militia at Srebrenica. The gov-
50 Ignatieff, supra note 48. 
51 Beth Van Schaack, Darfur and the Rhetoric of Genocide, 26 WHITTIER L. REV. 1101, 
1141 (2005). 
52 Jamal Jafari & Paul R. Williams, A Coward’s Way Out, NAT’L L. J., Oct. 22, 2007, 
available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1192525413042. 
53 Judgment (Bosn. v. Serb.), supra note 43, at 154, 158. 
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ernment of Slobodan Milosevic, in neighboring Serbia, knew this massacre 
was likely to happen and yet did nothing to stop it, even though Belgrade 
retained significant influence over the Bosnian Serb forces. According to 
the ICJ, not only did Serbia have a duty under the Genocide Convention to 
prevent the massacre, but it also “does not need to be proven that the State 
concerned definitely had the power to prevent genocide; it is sufficient that 
it had the means to do so and that it manifestly refrained from using 
them.”54
The United Nations’ International Commission on Intervention and 
State Sovereignty iterated this duty in its 2001 report “The Responsibility to 
Protect.”55 The duty to prevent genocide recognized in this report included 
military intervention by the U.N. Security Council to stop it from occurring. 
But the possibility of intervention by the General Assembly, military al-
liances (such as NATO), or other states were neither excluded nor re-
quired—leaving the door open for the continued use of humanitarian inter-
vention. 
Indeed, this may all go back to where we started—a fairly narrow 
definition for genocide, accompanied by a nebulous duty to prevent it, along 
with the option—though not the requirement—of military intervention. As 
José Alvarez, president of the American Society of International Law, re-
flects: 
Given the schizophrenias of [the Responsibility to Protect], the maligned 
limits of humanitarian intervention merit a second look. . . . Humanitarian 
intervention  . . . does little to threaten the traditional rights of sovereigns. 
On the contrary, the reference to “intervention” emphasizes its opposite: 
the ordinary rule of non-intervention. Humanitarian intervention does not 
suggest that by merely ratifying the UN Charter states sign away their so-
vereignty. Humanitarian intervention, however ambiguous its scope, was 
never conceived as anything but an add-on to the existing rules of interna-
tional law, including the rules of self-defense. Unlike [the Responsibility 
to Protect], humanitarian intervention did not aspire to fundamentally re-
orient a state-centric system of rules away from state centricity. If the 20th 
century’s failures to intervene gave us [the Responsibility to Protect, the 
21st century’s endless “war” on terror and the quagmire in Iraq are forcing 
us to appreciate anew the merits of old-fashioned humanitarian interven-
tion.56
54 Id. at 158. 
55 See generally INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY 
[ICISS], THE RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: REPORT OF THE ICISS (2001), available at
http://www.responsibilitytoprotect.org/ (embracing the “responsibility to protect” against 
genocide, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing). 
56 José E. Alvarez, The Schizophrenias of R2P, AM. SOC’Y OF INT’L L NEWSLETTER, Sum-
mer 2007, at 1, 11, available at http://www.asil.org/newsletter/president/pres070927.html.
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Ultimately, application of the genocide label to a given atrocity is 
still a very political calculation, as offensive as that is. States want to retain 
the option of acting, but avoid the specific requirement of doing so. Expand-
ing the legal definition, adding new protected groups, and characterizing the 
obligation to prevent as an affirmative state-centered, as opposed to a col-
lective, duty of military intervention sends a shudder down the spines of 
politicians with deployable military units.  
The hand-wringing will continue, and action may be had where ge-
nocide coincides with individual national policy preferences, but a consis-
tent policy of intervention to stop genocide around the world, wherever it 
may erupt, especially under an expanded definition, is still a long way off. 
States are content for now to remain like Yeats’ Irish airmen, acting on oc-
casion, but under neither law nor duty, so long as they can keep either at 
bay. 
